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STATEMENT OF IURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (2002). In the event the case is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
its jurisdiction would be pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that appellants, as condominium home 
owners, are entitled to the same protections under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act (the "Lien Restriction Act" or "Act") as other home owners? 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine that an individual residential 
condominium unit qualifies as a "residence" as defined by the Lien Restriction Act, Utah 
Code Ann § 38-11-102(20)? 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for "correctness." See, e.g., 
I.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int'l, 2000 UT 92; Harlinev. Barken 912 P.2d 433, 438 
(Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES 
1. Lien Restriction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(16) and (20) (2001): 
(16) "Owner-occupied residence" means a residence that is, or after 
completion of the construction on the residence will be, occupied by the 
owner or the owner's tenant or lessee as a primary or secondary 
residence within 180 days from the date of the completion of the 
construction on the residence. 
(20) "Residence" means an improvement to real property used or 
occupied, to be used or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary 
or secondary detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up 
to two units, including factory built housing. 
2. Utah Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-4 (2000): 
Each unit, together with its undivided interest in the common areas 
and facilities, shall, for all purposes, constitute real property and may be 
individually conveyed, leased and encumbered and may be inherited or 
devised by will and be subject to all types of juridic acts inter vivos or 
mortis causa as if it were sole and entirely independent of all other units, 
and the separate units shall have the same incidents as real property, and 
the corresponding individual titles and interests therein shall be 
recordable. 
3. Utah Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-35 (2000): 
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall be in addition and 
supplemental to all other provisions of law, statutory or judicially 
declared, provided that wherever the application of the provisions of this 
chapter conflict with the application of such other provisions, this 
chapter shall prevail: provided further, for purposes of Sections 
10-9-805, 10-9-811, and 17-27-804 and provisions of similar import and 
any law or ordinance adopted pursuant thereto, a condominium project 
shall be construed to be a subdivision, and a record of survey map or 
supplement thereto prepared pursuant to this chapter shall be considered 
to be a subdivision map or plat, only with respect to: 
(a) such real property or improvements, if any, as are intended to 
be dedicated to the use of the public in connection with the creation 
of the condominium project or portion thereof concerned; and 
(b) those units, if any, included in the condominium project or 
portion thereof concerned which are not contained in existing or 
proposed buildings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This case arises from numerous mechanic's liens filed against the residential 
condominium units owned by appellees Guy G. Berryessa, Ann M. Farley, Janet Heidt, 
Curt G. Hood, and Jennifer C. Smith (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Home 
Owners"). The Home Owners' separately owned units are located in the Calgary 
Condominiums within Bear Hollow Village in Park City, Summit County, Utah. The Home 
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Owners purchased and fully paid for their individual units from the project developer, Bear 
Hollow Village, L L C , pursuant to written real estate purchase agreements. 
LKL Associates, Inc. initially filed the action to foreclose mechanic's liens. [R. 1-15.] 
Superior Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and Superior Insulation Company, Inc., two other 
subcontractors on the project who were named as defendants by LKL Associates, Inc., filed 
claims against the Home Owners also seeking to foreclose mechanic's liens. [R. 96-122, 
185-202.] 
The Home Owners filed summary judgment motions under the Lien Restriction Act 
utilizing the forms provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(4)(a). [R. 131-52 (Curt 
Hood); 163-84 (Jennifer Smith); 203-16 (Guy Berryessa); 227-42 (Janet Heidt); and 459-76 
(Ann Farley).] The summary judgment motions were argued before the Honorable Robert 
K. Hilder on September 24, 2001 and February 4, 2002. [R. 671-713, 718-48.] At the 
conclusion of the arguments, Judge Hilder granted the motions for summary judgment, 
ruling that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that the Home Owners were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the mechanic's lien claimants could not 
maintain liens against the Home Owners' residential condominium units under the 
provisions of the Lien Restriction Act. [R. 708-10, 744.] 
On June 24, 2002, Judge Hilder entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
the Home Owners' motions for summary judgment and an Order of Judgment granting the 
summary judgment motions filed by Guy G. Berryessa, Janet Heidt, Curt G. Hood, and 
Jennifer C. Smith. [R. 612-624.]1 Ann M. Farley was unintentionally omitted from the 
1Copies of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Orders and Judgment with 
respect to the Home Owners are included in the addendum to this brief. 
court's written rulings and, as a result, on August 2, 2002, Judge Hilder entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment granting summary judgment in 
favor of Ann M. Farley. [R. 649-660.] Because the summary judgments adjudicated all 
claims against the Home Owners, Judge Hilder entered a certification of finality with 
respect to each Order and Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. [R. 621, 657.] This appeal was taken from the summary judgments granted in 
favor of the Home Owners. 
2. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The undisputed material facts on which Judge Hilder based his conclusion that the 
Lien Restriction Act protects the Home Owners from mechanic's liens are as follows:2 
1. The Home Owners each own a separate residential unit within the Calgary 
Condominiums located in Park City, Utah. Guy G. Berryessa owns unit number 
204, Ann M. Farley owns unit number 203, Janet Heidt owns unit number 200, 
Curt G. Hood owns unit number 101, and Jennifer C. Smith owns unit number 103. 
2. Each of the Home Owners entered into a separate written contract with the 
developer Bear Hollow Village, LLC to purchase their residential condominium unit 
and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion of construction thereof. 
3. Bear Hollow Village, LLC was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii). 
4. Each of the Home Owners paid Bear Hollow Village, LLC in full in 
accordance with the terms of their written purchase contracts. 
2The undisputed facts are set forth in the findings of fact entered with respect to the 
summary judgment rulings. [R. 613-615, 650-651.] 
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5. Each of the Home Owners' residences is a separate unit located within the 
Calgary Condominium project. The Calgary Condominium project consists of two 
buildings. Each building contains ten separate condominium units. 
The Lien Restriction Act prohibits contractors and suppliers from maintaining 
mechanic's liens against an "owner-occupied residence" where the owner enters into a 
written contract for the purchase or construction of the residence with a licensed contractor 
or a real estate developer, the owner occupies the residence as a primary or secondary 
residence within 180 days from the completion of construction and pays the full contract 
price. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107(1) (2001). The only challenge made to the 
application of the Lien Restriction Act in this case was the argument that a condominium 
unit cannot qualify as a "residence" under the Lien Restriction Act's definitions. Judge 
Hilder rejected that argument, concluding that the Lien Restriction Act's definition of 
"residence" includes an owner of an individual residential condominium unit. 
[R. 615-617, 651-653.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Lien Restriction Act was adopted to protect innocent home owners, who have 
fully paid for their homes, from mechanic's liens. Under long-established rules of statutory 
construction, the Act must be construed to achieve its intended purpose. Judge Hilder 
correctly concluded that the Act's definition of "residence" includes both single-family 
homes and individually owned, single-family condominium units. That conclusion is 
mandated by the Condominium Ownership Act, which requires condominium units to be 
treated as real property entirely independent of all other units. Interpreting the Act's 
definition of "residence" to include both single-family homes and condominium units 
avoids an unconstitutional reading under the equal protection clause of the Utah 
Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Lien Restriction Act Must Be Interpreted to Achieve the Intended Purpose of 
Protecting Individual Home Owners Who Have Fully Paid for their Homes. 
CraCar asks the court to construe narrowly the Lien Restriction Act's definition of 
"residence" to exclude an entire class of home owners from the Act's protection. CraCar 
argues that the Act's definition of "residence" includes single-family homes, but not 
single-family condominium units. CraCar's arguments are contrary to established rules of 
statutory construction that require the Act to be interpreted to achieve its intended purpose. 
1. Applicable Rules of Statutory Interpretation. 
It is well-established that "the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." 
Reeves v. Gentile,, 813 P.2d 111,115 (Utah 1991). Further, "the plain language of a statute 
is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in 
the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters." Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, 1 17 (quoting Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted)). Remedial statutes are to be given a liberal construction to achieve their 
obvious and intended purposes. See, e.g., P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 
P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988); Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 758 P.2d 957, 961 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Statutes are to be interpreted reasonably and sensibly and in a way that avoids 
an absurd result. See e.g., Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 906 (Utah 
1992); State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute 
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should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not 
intend an absurd result"). 
2. The Utah Residence Lien and Lien Restriction Recovery Fund Act. 
The Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act was adopted by the 
Utah Legislature to protect innocent home purchasers from mechanic's liens asserted by 
unpaid contractors and suppliers. Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-107(1) (2001) entitled 
"Restrictions Upon Maintaining a Lien Against Residence or Owner's Interest in the 
Residence," provides as follows: 
(1) A person qualified to file a lien upon an owner-occupied residence 
and the real property associated with that residence under the provisions of 
Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, who provides qualified services under 
an agreement effective on or after January 1, 1995, other than directly with the 
owner, shall be barred after lanuary 1, 1995, from maintaining a lien upon 
that residence and real property or recovering a judgment in any civil action 
against the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover monies owed 
for qualified services provided by that person if: 
(a) the conditions described in Subsections 38-11-204(3)(a) and 
(3)(b) are met; . . . . 
jd- § 38-11-107(1) (emphasis added). The conditions described in subsections 
38-11-204(3)(a) and (3)(b) require that the owner of the owner-occupied residence enter 
into a written contract with a licensed contractor or with a real estate developer for the 
purchase of an owner-occupied residence; and that the owner pay in full the licensed 
contractor or real estate developer. See idL § 38-11-204(3). 
Under the foregoing provisions, a contractor who provides labor or material used in 
the construction of an "owner-occupied residence" cannot claim a mechanic's lien against 
the residence or recover a civil judgment against the owner if these conditions have been 
satisfied. Upon proof that the conditions have been satisfied and the entry of findings of 
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compliance by the court, the contractor or supplier is entitled to file a claim against the 
residence hen recovery fund funded by contractor licensing fees and administered by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing under the Utah Department of 
Commerce. See id. §§ 38-11-201 to -204.3 
The Act defines an "owner-occupied residence" as a residence that wil l be occupied 
by the owner or the owner's tenant "as a primary or secondary residence within 180 days 
from the date of the completion oi the construction on the residence." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-11-102(16). The act goes on to define a "residence" as, 
An improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used or occupied as, 
or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary detached single-family 
dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units, including factory built 
housing. 
id § 38-11-102(20). Consistent with the long-standing rules of statutoiy and consttuction, 
this definition must be construed to give effect to the legislative intent of piotecting 
innocent home purchasers. 
B. ludge Hilder Correctly Interpreted the Lien Restriction Act's Definition of "Residence" 
to Include Individually Owned Residential Condominium Units. 
Judge Hilder construed the Lien Restriction Act's definition of "residence" broadly to 
give effect to the obvious legislative intent of protecting innocent home purchasers from 
mechanic's liens. Judge Hilder's conclusion is both consistent with the language and 
3lt is interesting to note that Superior Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and Superior Insulation 
Company, Inc., both subcontractors of CraCar, did not appeal Judge Hilder's ruling and are 
free to pursue their claims against the residence lien recovery fund. This appeal was 
brought by CraCar, the general contractor who failed to pay its subcontractors. Obviously, 
CraCar would rather have its subcontractors paid by the innocent home owners, who have 
already paid once for their condominiums, than the residence hen recovery fund since 
CraCar would then be obligated to reimburse the fund under Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-207 
or face the immediate suspension of its contractor's license under that section. 
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purpose of the Lien Restriction Act and is mandated by Utah's Condominium Ownership 
Act (the "Condominium Act"). 
1. The Definition of "Residence" Focuses on the Character of Ownership. 
Judge Hilder correctly ruled that the Lien Restriction Act's definition of "residence" 
"focuses on the character of the ownership of the residence" to fulfill its obvious remedial 
purpose. [R. 61 5, 651.] By so ruling, Judge Hilder observed that the definitions of the 
terms "residence" and "owner-occupied residence" address how the property in question is 
actually used by its owner, i.e., is it to be used or occupied by the owner or its tenant as a 
primary or secondary residence. 
CraCar argues for a narrow interpretation of "residence" by misconstruing the words 
"detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two units" as excluding 
individually owned condominium units. The Lien Restriction Act does not define what is 
meant by a "single-family dwelling" or how and from what such a dwelling must be 
detached. The Lien Restriction Act likewise does not define what is meant by a 
"multifamily dwelling up to two units." CraCar's interpretation places awkward emphasis 
on these phrases and asks the court to look at them in isolation of any other part of the Lien 
Restriction Act. Doing so would require the court to render meaningless the parts of the 
definitions of "residence" and "owner-occupied residence" that reference the use of the 
property in question and would create the absurd result that condominiums with two units 
are protected but condominiums of greater-sized units are not (not to mention the absurdity 
that condominium owners are unnecessarily excluded from a remedial statutory provision, 
despite owning property with all other indicia and attributes as other property owners that 
do enjoy the protections of the Act). By recognizing that the definition focuses on the 
character of ownership and not just physical detachment, Judge Hilder logically concluded 
that a separately owned single-family condominium unit is protected just like the owner of 
a single-family home. [R. 615,651] 
CraCai argues that the Act's definitions do not focus on ownership character, but are 
solely dependent on physical detachment According to CraCar, Judge Hilder should have 
construed the words "detached single-family dwelling" to refer only to the physical 
relationship of the unit to surrounding units. That argument incorrectly assumes that a 
condominium unit is not physically detached from adjacent units and does not allow for 
the possibility that "detached" could refer to ownership instead of a physical relationship 4 
More importantly, CraCar's argument violates the rules of construction that required Judge 
Hilder to interpret the language consistent with the intent of the statute 
2 Individually Owned Condominium Units Must Be Treated As Real Property 
Entirely Independent of All Other Units Under the Plain Language of the 
Condominium Ownership Act 
Judge Hilder's ruling pioperly takes into consideration several provisions of the 
Condominium Act, thus adhenng to the requirement that the Lien Restriction Act be read 
as a whole and in harmony with related statues (m. pari materia) which, in this case, 
includes the Condominium Act. 
Condominium owners, by nature of the ownership discussed below, own in fee simple all 
of the internal parts oi their unit, including the interior walls only As such, condominium 
ownership is moie "detached" than traditional lots, which touch at the property lines 
Condominium owners' exclusively owned property boundaries, as delinated by declaration 
condominium and record of survey, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-8-10, -13 (2000), do not 
similarly touch each other The Condominium Act defines each separately owned "unit" as 
"a separate physical part of the property intended for any type of independent use." kj 
§ 57-8-3(26). 
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As recognized by Judge Hilder, the Condominium Act requires that individually 
owned condominium units be treated as real property separate and distinct from all other 
units. The Condominium Act specifically provides that: 
Each [condominium] unit, together with its undivided interest in the 
common areas and facilities, shall, for all purposes, constitute real property 
and may be individually conveyed, leased and encumbered and may be 
inherited or devised by wil l and be subject to all types of juridic acts inter 
vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and entirely independent of all other 
units, and the separate units shall have the same incidents as real property, 
and the corresponding individual titles and interests therein shall be 
recordable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-4 (2000) (emphasis added). Each condominium unit is delineated 
in three dimensions by a record of survey map recorded with a declaration of 
condominium, jd. § 57-8-13, and includes only the physical space within the walls of the 
unit, jd. § 57-8-3(26) (defining "unit" as "a separate physical part of the property intended 
for any type of independent use."); see Country Oaks Condominium Management Comm. 
v. ]ones, 851 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that for a condominium unit to exist, 
it must be in an enclosed space). Thus, it is clear that a condominium unit must be treated 
as a separate parcel of real property (or "detached" under the terminology of the Lien 
Restriction Act) independent of other units. 
CraCar glosses over the provisions of the Condominium Act that would be rendered 
meaningless by its proposed interpretation of the Lien Restriction Act. For example, 
CraCar discards § 57-8-19 as a section that "simply clarifies that condominium units are 
susceptible to the same liens and encumbrances which arise against non-condominium 
properties." [See appellant's brief at p. 12.] Such argument gives little credence to the 
language that condominium liens are to be created "in the same manner and under the 
same conditions in every respect as liens or encumbrances may arise or be created upon or 
against any other separate parcel of real property subject to individual ownership" 
(emphasis added). Interpreting the Lien Restriction Act as CraCar argues of course would 
create a separate body of mechanic's lien law relative to condominiums in direct 
contravention of this language of sameness. 
Judge Hilder's ruling also correctly identifies as support for his interpretation that an 
individually owned condominium unit is a detached single-family dwelling. Judge Hilder's 
ruling cites to the separate taxation of each unit, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-27. Similarly, 
each condominium unit may be rented or owned jointly or in other tenancies, kL, 
§ 57-8-5; ownership is transferred via deed, just like other separately owned real property, 
id., § 57-8-11; and condominium ownership interests are recorded with a unique legal 
reference, just like traditional single-family homes, see, id., §§ 57-8-12, 57-8-14. 
Judge Hilder's ruling also correctly relies upon the explicit admonition of Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-8-35 that, 
this chapter shall be in addition and supplemental to all other provisions of 
law, statutory or judicially declared, provided that wherever the application of 
the provisions of this chapter conflict with the application of such other 
provisions, this chapter shall prevail. 
id. § 57-8-35 (emphasis added). Because of this provision, CraCar strains to find harmony 
between the Condominium Act and CraCar's narrow reading of the definition of 
"residence" in the Lien Restriction Act. In reality, CraCar's interpretation conflicts with the 
express language of the Condominium Act, §§ 57-8-4 ("entirely independent of all other 
units"), 57-8-19 ("separate parcel of real property" and liens same in every respect as liens 
on other forms of lienable property). In short, the Condominium Act goes to great lengths 
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to make clear that ownership of such property is in all ways equivalent to ownership of any 
other residence. This Court should, therefore, affirm Judge Hilder's conclusion that the 
clear provisions of the Condominium Act mandate that individually owned residential 
condominiums qualify for protection against mechanic's liens the same as any other 
single-family residence. 
C. judge Hilder's Construction of the Lien Restriction Act to Protect All Home Owners 
Avoids a Constitutional Equal Protection Problem. 
Judge Hilder interpreted the Lien Protection Act in a way that avoids a constitutional 
equal protection problem. CraCar's assertion that the "constitutional argument was not 
properly raised before the trial court" [see appellant's brief at p. 16] completely misses this 
point. The Home Owners did not argue before the trial court that the statute is 
unconstitutional.5 Consequently, there was no requirement to serve a copy of a pleading 
on the Attorney General under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11, which only applies where a 
statute "is alleged to be invalid." Rather, the Home Owners argued that Judge Hilder 
should apply the rule of construction that where two possible interpretations of a statute 
can be made, the constitutional construction should be adopted. [R. 688-89.] See 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). Judge 
Hilder correctly concluded that "if the Lien Protection Act's definition of 'residence' were 
to be construed as excluding condominium units, the statute may be unconstitutional 
under the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 24." [R. 617, 
652-653.] 
Procedurally, Judge Hilder decided the appellees' summary judgment motions on the 
basis of statutory interpretation. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is a canon of 
statutory interpretation. Were the Court to grant CraCar's requested relief, the case would 
be remanded so that the constitutional equal protection argument could be briefed. 
Article I, § 24 oi the Utah Constitution states: "All laws oi a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has held that the essence of this 
constitutional provision is "the settled concern of the law that the legislature be restrained 
from the fundamentally unfair practice of classifying persons in such a manner that those 
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law are treated differently by 
the law, to the detriment of some of those so classified." Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 
1 36 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989)). 
Rather than holding the Lien Restriction Act unconstitutional for classifying and protecting 
only the purchasers of traditional single-family homes from mechanic's liens and excluding 
purchasers of single-family condominiums from this protection, Judge Hilder properly 
construed the definition of residence to be inclusive. 
The constitutional avoidance rule oi construction was, in fact, raised below and 
applied by the trial court as "good basic law." [R. 692.] Consequently, the doctrine can 
certainly be considered by the appellate court. Moreover, this Court is allowed to consider 
any argument that supports the ruling below. "Indeed, it is well established that an 
appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from 
that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even 
though such ground or theory is not urged on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the 
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." First Equity Fed., 
Inc. v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002 UT 56, at f 11, 52 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Utah 2002). This 
Court, like Judge Hilder, can and should consider the constitutional ramifications of the 
decision CraCar seeks. Such measured consideration shows the absurdity and oddity of 
14 
CraCar's proposed interpretation and gives this Court additional reason to affirm Judge 
Hilder's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Home Owners respectfully submit that the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment should be affirmed. The Lien Restriction Act must be construed to include 
condominium home owners within its protection consistent with the provisions and intent 
of the Lien Restriction Act and the mandates of the Condominium Act. Further, the trial 
court's inclusive interpretation avoids a reading of the statute that may render the statute 
unconstitutional 
DATED this ^ 
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PARR WAEfDOUPS BROWN GELA LOVELESS 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant Ann M. Farley and 
Third-Party Defendant Curt G. Hood 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
LKL ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANET HEIDT; JAMES E. CARUSO; 
WILLIAM JACKSON; JILLIAN 
ANDERSON; ANN M. FARLEY; GUY G. 
BERRYESSA; FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB; 
APPROVED FINANCIAL CORP.; WELLS 
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; 
ADVANCE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION; SUPERIOR 
INSULATION CO.; WESTERN 
WHOLESALE FLOORING; ANDERSON 
LUMBER COMPANY; SUPERIOR 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.; JM 
MECHANICAL/SERVICE EXPERTS; AQUA 
BALANCE, INC.; ROB CHLARSON; 
DENNIS SKIBY; and JOHN DOES 1-20; 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
HOME OWNERS' MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010500202 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on motions for summary judgment filed by 
defendants Janet Heidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G Hood, and Jennifer C. Smith ("Home 
Owners"). The court heard initial arguments on the motion on September 24, 2001 and 
permitted additional briefing. The motions were heard again on oral argument on February 
4, 2002. 
The court, having reviewed the Home Owners' motions for summary judgment, 
affidavits, and supporting documentation as well as all opposing materials, having 
reviewed exhibits, having heard oral argument, having reviewed the relevant facts and law, 
and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Janet Heidt is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 200, Park City, Utah. 
2. Janet Heidt entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. to 
purchase her condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion of 
construction thereof. 
3. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Janet Heidt paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 
terms of the written contract. 
5. Defendant Guy G. Berryessa is the owner oi the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 204, Park City, Utah. 
6. Guy G. Berryessa entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, 
L.L.C . to purchase his condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after 
completion of construction thereof. 
7. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
8. Guy G. Berryessa paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with 
the terms of the written contract. 
9. Defendant Curt G. Hood is the owner of of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No, 101, Park City, Utah. 
10. Curt G. Hood entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. 
to purchase his unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion of 
construction thereof. 
11. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
12. Curt G. Hood paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 
terms of the written contract. 
13. Defendant Jennifer C. Smith is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 103, Park City, Utah. 
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described in the foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" under Utah Code. 
Ann. § 38-11-102(20). 
3. The court's conclusion that the each of the condominium units described in 
the foregoing Findings of Fact qualifies as a "residence" is mandated by the provisions of 
the Condominium Ownership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1, et. seq., which provides, 
among other things, that 
(a) liens may be created against each separate condominium unit only in the 
manner applicable to "any other separate parcel of real property subject to 
individual ownership. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19(1); 
(b) A condominium project is treated as a subdivision and the individual 
units are treated as separate tax parcels for taxation purposes, id- §§ 57-8-27 and 
-35; and 
(c) The Condominium Ownership Act controls over any conflict with other 
statutory provisions. Jd. § 57-8-35. 
4. The court further concludes that interpreting the definition of "residence" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(20) to include a condominium unit occupied as a single 
family residence as stated above is consistent with the purpose and policy of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act to protect innocent home owners who have 
paid the full purchase price for their homes from mechanic's liens. This policy applies 
5 08'IP, 
equally to the pi irchaser of a single fai i lily I iiome in a typical subdi\ isiot i as it does to tl ie 
r ' 
5. The court further concludes that such constn iction of 'he statutory tienr i . •. ( 
"residence" comports wit! i tl ie i i lie of constn ictioi t tl lat vvl lere two possible interpretations 
of a stati ite cai 1 be i i iade, tl i EI COI istiti itioi lal :: 3i isti i ictioi i si 101 ild be adopted, Mom rta.it i 
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Payne, 782 P.2d 404 i l lah l 'W)' If mo del'initior r 
"residence" wen ;;, be const' . -., , i . .,, . . ; •., .,\. . .. ie \ .:•. 
i incor istiti ition jnuer the eqi lal protectioi i provision of tl ie Utah Constitution, Article I, 
§ 24. The construction adon*^1 hv tiV n.ur avoids this constitt itional problem. 
ordering - j Parties in thib action who \\d\^ ,,ieu mechanic b i i u i i ugainbt the residences of 
said Defendants to remove said liens within 10 days after receiving notice of the entry of 
parties v\ho tai 4 so removv !::pir !i»M^ consistent ••• ' * laii Code Anr• ^ i8-l -.0 "M., 
ant- t* IM!;;S^ *_ . t ; . .J.VJ i aa , t, •,, -. i , t^ ^ ,,on as a^amr-: -,ai ; ue:e.oc«iia$. 




Hohc^able RoberfK. Hilder 
District Court Ji idge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^f-l^-day of June, 2002 a true and correct copy of 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON HOME OWNERS 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Clair J. Jaussi, Esq. 
Randy J. Christiansen, Esq. 
350 East Center Street, Suite 2 
Post Office -Box 2282 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Esq. 
420 East South Temple, Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
KIPP& CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John G. Mulliner, Esq. 
363 North University Avenue, Suite 103 
Post Office Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Bryan H. Booth, Esq. 
KIRTON McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
7 
Christopher L. Ureenwww.-
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
1840 North Siaip Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah R-Jh.H 
Dwayne A. \di.>.". •. .<\ 
TESCH VANCE & MILLER 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 3V'(i 
Park City, Utah g-HihO 
Janet Heidt 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. zOO 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Guy G. Berryessa 
5441 Bobsled BouK ..: 
PT.1. r;i* i !t-ih rur-..'-
Jeiv.'lfr C S''" 
Post Office Box 981584 
Park City, Utah 84098 
8 
™3D DISTRICT COURT-SI/MHir 
WlMZk fl;i|i: -7 
'"(LCD B y
-JL^Jj' 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
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Third-Party Defendant Curt G. Hood 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
LKL ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JANET HEIDT; JAMES E. CARUSO; 
WILLIAM JACKSON; JILLIAN 
ANDERSON; ANN M. FARLEY; GUY G. 
BERRYESSA; FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB; 
APPROVED FINANCIAL CORP.; WELLS 
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; 
ADVANCE MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION; SUPERIOR 
INSULATION CO.; WESTERN 
WHOLESALE FLOORING; ANDERSON 
LUMBER COMPANY; SUPERIOR 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.; JM 
MECHANICAL/SERVICE EXPERTS; AQUA 
BALANCE, INC.; ROB CHLARSON; 
DENNIS SKIBY; and JOHN DOES 1-20; 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010500202 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants. 
The coi jrt having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions oi aw <>n • '• _••• _ 
Owners' Motioi is for Sut i in lai ) ' judgment and for good cai ise appearing, 
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Sumr : i" r i i i n t y ' Itah are required to remove said liens within 10 days of receiving notice 
r. 
' 'pfpndants Janet t leidt, Guy G. Berryessa, Curt G, Hood, and Je.nnifi*' <' 
Si i litl i sit ia.I! be awarded their costs and attorney's fees as against those parties wh. • *a« to 
remove their liens as required by tl le foregoii ig paragi apl n 2 as i i ia> be established I j) 
affidavit, 
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I -lood; and Jennifei C Smith ai id directs ih.j* ' i '.idgment be entered as a final judgment 
i;|: i II si tai it to I l\ lie 54(b) oi ' tl le I 'tal i • .:cedi n B. 
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INSULATION CO.; WESTERN 
WHOLESALE FLOORING; ANDERSON 
LUMBER COMPANY; SUPERIOR 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.; JM 
MECHANICAL/SERVICE EXPERTS; AQUA 
BALANCE, INC.; ROB CHLARSON; 
DENNIS SKIBY; and JOHN DOES 1-20; 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
ANN M. FARLEY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010500202 
Judge Robert K. Milder 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on the motions for summary judgment filed by 
certain Home Owner defendants including Ann M. Farley. The court heard initial 
arguments on the motions on September 24, 2001 and permitted additional briefing. The 
motions were heard again on oral argument on February 4, 2002. 
The court, having reviewed the motions for summary judgment, affidavits, and 
supporting documentation as well as all opposing materials, having reviewed exhibits, 
having heard oral argument, having reviewed the relevant facts and law, and otherwise 
being fully advised in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to Home Owner Ann M. Farley: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Ann M. Farley is the owner of the condominium unit more 
particularly described as 5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 203, Park City, Utah. 
2. Ann M. Farley entered into a written contract with Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. 
to purchase her condominium unit and occupied the unit within 180 days after completion 
of construction thereof. 
3. Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. was a real estate developer within the meaning of 
38-11-102(19) and 38-11-204(3)(a)(ii) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Ann M. Farley paid Bear Hollow Village, L.L.C. in full in accordance with the 
terms of the written contract. 
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(a) liens may be created against each separate condominium unit only in the 
manner applicable to "any other separate parcel of real property subject to 
individual ownership. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-19(1); 
(b) A condominium project is treated as a subdivision and the individual 
units are treated as separate tax parcels for taxation purposes, jd. §§ 57-8-27 and 
-35; and 
(c) The Condominium Ownership Act controls over any conflict with other 
statutory provisions, jd. § 57-8-35. 
4. The court further concludes that interpreting the definition of "residence" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-102(20) to include a condominium unit occupied as a single 
family residence as stated above is consistent with the purpose and policy of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act to protect innocent home owners who have 
paid the full purchase price for their homes from mechanic's liens. This policy applies 
equally to the purchaser of a single family home in a typical subdivision as it does to the 
purchaser of a single family home in a condominium project. 
5. The court further concludes that such construction of the statutory definition of 
"residence" comports with the rule of construction that where two possible interpretations 
of a statute can be made, the constitutional construction should be adopted. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). If the definition of 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
6 06%d 
i. : j 'i • i:. ureenwooi. 
GRl- W V O O D & BLACK 
1840 • "• Slate Street, Suite 200 
Pr,.-. ., L-triti 84.,04 
v v d i iL.tr, L S C | . 
.ANCE& MILLER 
3 i~ '.l.n-i Street, Suite 201 
PoM '• )trico Box 3 590 
•V • ' ! " 84060 
Jai.C. . , l ; i J ! 
5441 Bobsled B.>nlovjr<i. ,\o. 200 
Park City, Utah 8-1098 
Guy G. Berryessa 
5441 Bobsled Boulr •. 
Park City, Utah 84-"-' o 
Jennifer C. Smith 
Post Office Box 981 584 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant Ann M. Farley and 
Third-Party Defendant Curt G. Hood 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
LKL ASSOCIATES, INC., ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
JANET HEIDT; JAMES E.CARUSO; ) 
WILLIAM JACKSON; JILLIAN ) 
ANDERSON; ANN M.FARLEY; GUY G. ) 
BERRYESSA; FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB; ) 
APPROVED FINANCIAL CORP.; WELLS ) 
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; ) 
ADVANCE MORTGAGE ) 
CORPORATION; SUPERIOR ) 
INSULATION CO.; WESTERN ) 
WHOLESALE FLOORING; ANDERSON ) 
LUMBER COMPANY; SUPERIOR ) Civil No. 010500202 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.; JM ) Judge Robert K. Hilder 
MECHANICAL/SERVICE EXPERTS; AQUA ) 
BALANCE, INC.; ROB CHLARSON; ) 
DENNIS SKIBY; and JOHN DOES 1-20; ) 
Defendants. 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Ann M. 
Farley's Motion for Summary Judgment and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Ann M. Farley is 
granted and judgment is hereby entered in favor of said defendant dismissing, with 
prejudice, all claims and causes of action asserted herein as against her. 
2. That all parties to this action who have filed mechanic's liens against Unit 203 
of the Calgary Condominiums located in Park City, Summit County, Utah are required to 
remove said liens within 10 days of receiving notice of the entry of this Order and 
Judgment. 
3. Defendant Ann M. Farley shall be awarded her costs and attorney's fees as 
against those parties who fail to remove their liens as required by the foregoing paragraph 
2, as may be established by affidavit. 
4. The court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay in that this 
judgment adjudicates all claims against defendant Ann M. Farley and directs that this 
judgment be entered as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
A DATED this W ^ d a y of J ^ ^ ^ f , 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Robert KTHilder 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the yt-^ 'day of July, 2002 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Clair J. Jaussi, Esq. 
Randy J. Christiansen, Esq. 
350 East Center Street, Suite 2 
Post Office Box 2282 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Esq. 
420 East South Temple, Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darrel J. Bostwick, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John G. Mulliner, Esq. 
363 North University Avenue, Suite 103 
Post Office Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Bryan H. Booth, Esq. 
KIRTON McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Christopher D. Greenwood, Esq. 
GREENWOOD & BLACK 
1840 North State Street, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Dwayne A. Vance, Esq. 
TESCH VANCE & MILLER 
314 Main Street, Suite 201 
Post Office Box 3390 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Janet Heidt 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 200 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Guy G. Berryessa 
5441 Bobsled Boulevard, No. 204 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Jennifer C. Smith 
Post Office Box 981584 
Park City, Utah 84098 
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